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Mesoamerica2 is currently facing a daunting development challenge.  
After about a decade and a half of implementing outward-oriented 
development policies, it is time to reckon the results of this model and to 
figure out new, creative, and more effective strategies for moving the bulk 
of its population out of poverty.  The outcomes of the outward-oriented 
development model have been disappointing in Mesoamerica according to a 
number of indicators of socioeconomic development.  Despite an 
impressive expansion of exports, economic growth has been below 
expected rates.  Even though for a period of approximately ten years, 
exports have expanded by more than fourfold, average income per capita 
has increased by only 20 percent.3  This is a meager performance if 
compared to the 9–10 percent average annual rate of economic growth that 
China has experienced in the same period of time.  Another remarkable 
feature is that economic growth in the countries that make up Mesoamerica 
has been very unstable across time, experiencing alternate phases of booms 
and bursts, including the occurrence of severe economic crises.  
Furthermore, there have not been major improvements with regards to 
poverty alleviation or income inequality, and particularly in Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala, high levels of violent crimes have been 
persistent.4  
A key component of the outward-oriented development model was the 
creation of special zones for the promotion of exports—zones where so-
called “maquila” plants were established.  A bundle of economic policies 
for the promotion of the maquila sector, including tax exceptions, 
deregulations, and the facilitation of temporary imports, were applied by all 
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the countries of the region.  Most of these measures were supposed to be a 
temporary means for the consolidation of a nascent, outward-oriented 
manufacturing industry.  NAFTA and the implementation of these 
economic policies produced a noteworthy transformation in the composition 
of exports.  Further, economic liberalization has considerably affected the 
performance of the rural sector.  Most governmental bodies hitherto 
involved in the commercialization or price control of agricultural products 
have been phased out, and state support for agricultural production has been 
greatly reduced, including technical advice and subsidies.  Additionally, 
trade liberalization has induced a downward trend in the prices of a number 
of agricultural products.  These processes have created conditions favoring 
economies of scale and have contributed to the displacement of small 
producers, subsequently resulting in massive out-migration of the rural 
poor.  
The outward-oriented model predicted that most of the labor surplus 
arising from rural-urban migration would be absorbed by the manufacturing 
export sector.  In reality, however, despite the expansion of exports and the 
structural changes in the composition of the economy, relatively high levels 
of migration suggest that employment growth in the manufacturing sector 
has not outweighed employment losses in the primary sector.  Migration to 
either marginal urban areas (in order to become part of the informal sector) 
or to North America has been the most common options for those laborers 
who were both displaced from rural areas by a lack of work and also could 
not be engaged as low-skill workers in the manufacturing or service sectors.  
In short, economic diversification and expansion of exports as a result of 
liberal economic reforms have not been accompanied by a generalized and 
sizeable improvement of development indicators in the region.  This 
contrasts sharply with the outcomes of globalization in other regions of the 
world, such as Southeast Asia or China, where a rapid integration into the 
world economy has been generally concomitant with declining poverty rates 
and high economic growth.5 
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Two critical factors have to be taken into account to understand why the 
results of the outward-oriented development model have been so 
disappointing in Mesoamerica: (1) the economic policies that have been 
implemented in order to promote export expansion, vis-à-vis those adopted 
more successfully in other regions of the world; and (2) the effect of China 
and other emerging Asian players on the role Mesoamerica plays in the 
world economy.  This paper focuses on the latter concern, although the 
former issue is also addressed briefly.  Hence, the two main questions to be 
tackled in this article are the following: (a) What are the effects of China on 
the way Mesoamerica integrates into the world economy, particularly with 
regard to its trade pattern with the United States?; and (b) What are the 
long-term development implications of these effects?  With those two 
questions in mind, this paper addresses basically three issues: (1) 
Mesoamerica’s trade patterns during the period of implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies; (2) China’s trade emergence and the 
subsequent impact on Mesoamerica; and (3) the environmental concerns 
that arise out of this.  The relationship between China’s integration into the 
world economy and development prospects in Mesoamerica is assessed 
principally through changes in export patterns from Mesoamerica to China 
and through competition between both regions in the area of exports of low-
tech manufactured products to the American market.  
The objective of this paper is to provide preliminary information to 
address the aforementioned questions, mainly by means of describing trends 
in export patterns in Mesoamerica during the period of implementation of 
economic liberalization policies.  The analysis is meant to be a pilot 
exercise that should bring about insights for further elaboration on this 
subject.  Section I, which follows this introduction, briefly describes the 
sources of data and analysis.  Section II summarizes the most relevant 
results.  The paper then concludes with a general discussion of the results, 
the implications of those results for development prospects in Mesoamerica, 
and some conclusive remarks.  
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I.   METHODS AND DATA SOURCES 
As stated above, the methodological approach of this paper focuses on 
analyzing trade patterns of key sectors during the period of implementation 
of the outward-oriented development model in Mesoamerica, with 
particular emphasis on trade with the United States (by far the largest 
trading partner), and a comparison with the performance of Chinese 
exports.  The figures presented in the following section are devoted to 
showing trends across time.  These results are expected to be the point of 
departure for the elaboration of working hypotheses and they should 
provide insights for further analysis.  Specifically, the following four trade 
patterns were analyzed: 
a. Exports of primary products and manufactured products based 
on natural resources, both in monetary and physical units, to the 
world and to China;   
b. Exports of pollution-intensive sectors, in physical units, to the 
world and China; 
        c. Total Latin American exports to China; and 
d. Share of U.S. imports from China and Mesoamerica in 
manufacturing sectors with low, medium, and high technological 
content. 
This paper has adopted ECLAC’s (Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean) classification system for grouping products 
according to their relative technological content and their pollution 
intensity.  The following is a summary of the categories used for this paper.  
Polluting sectors: pulp and paper, products derived from oil, chemical 
products, fertilizers, products manufactured from wood, minerals, and 
products derived from minerals.  
Primary products: fresh fruits, meat, rice, cocoa, tea, coffee, wood, coal, 
oil, gas, and concentrated minerals.  
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Manufactured products based on natural resources: products derived 
from fruits and meat, beverages, products derived from wood, vegetable 
oils, basic metals, products derived from oil, cement, glass, and precious 
stones.  
Low-tech manufactured products: textiles, cloth, shoes, products 
manufactured from leather, ceramics, simple metal structures, furniture, 
jewelery, toys, and plastic products. 
Medium-tech manufactured products: vehicles, synthetic fibers, 
chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, iron, steel, tubes, wires, engines, industrial 
machinery, pumps, watches, and ships. 
High-tech manufactured products: machines for data processing, 
telecommunication equipment, transistors, turbines, power equipment, 
pharmaceutical products, optical products, precision equipment, and 
photographic equipment.  
The data source is the online database BADACEL (Banco de Datos 
Estadísticos de Comercio Exterior), developed by ECLAC. 
II.   RESULTS  
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the degree of expansion of overall exports in 
Mesoamerica and Central America (Mesoamerica excluding Mexico) and 
the changes in the composition of exports that have taken place during the 
last two decades.  In the period of analysis, the region has experienced a 
remarkable decline in its share of the primary exports sector.  Nevertheless, 
Figure 4 shows that in spite of this, total exports of primary products and 
manufactured products based on natural resources have increased in a very 
remarkable manner when assessed using physical units (weight), both in 
Mesoamerica as a whole and in Central America.  This trend is likely 
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Figure 5 reveals that total exports (in physical units) of the most pollutant 
sectors have witnessed a cyclical trend, mainly driven by Mexican exports.  
In Central America, exports of the most pollutant products, measured in 
weight units, have remained rather constant and relatively negligible.  
Figure 6 illustrates exports of primary and polluting products from 
Mesoamerica to China across time, and Figure 7 illustrates the share of 
exports to China compared to total exports from Mesoamerica and Central 
America.  These figures show both that exports to China are still negligible 
compared to exports to other parts of the world, and that exports of natural 
resources to China are not significant and do not follow a clear trend across 
time.  This is in contrast to the trend in Latin America as a whole.  Figures 8 
and 9 reveal that the Chinese economic boom has induced rising physical 
outflows, driven by exports from South America, in both the primary and 
polluting sectors in Latin America.  
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Figure 10 depicts the share of U.S. imports, from Mesoamerica and 
China, of manufactured products with different technological content.  Even 
though this comparison does not establish a causal relationship between the 
two trends, the figure reveals that China’s share in American imports of 
manufactured products with low, medium, and high technological content 
has increased steadily, with a noticeable boost during the last five years of 
analysis.  Even though Mesoamerica’s share in American imports of low- 
and medium-technology manufactured products has also grown, during the 
last years of analysis the trend has shifted towards stagnation.  In the case of 
high-tech manufactured products, both regions have experienced a 
remarkable rise in their shares.  However, particularly during the last years 
of analysis, the rate of market share growth has been considerably higher 
for China than for Mesoamerica. These trends suggest that Chinese 
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competition is likely preventing further diversification of Mesoamerican 
economies.  Though difficult to test, further analysis should be devoted to 
assess this working hypothesis.  
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The main insights of the data analysis may be summarized as follows:  
 
•    Despite a declining share of primary exports to total exports in 
Mesoamerica, physical outflows of primary products and natural 
resource-based manufactured products have experienced a considerable 
expansion during the period of analysis.  
•    There are no clear trends with regard to the share of exports to China 
compared to total exports, or the physical flows of natural resources or 
polluting sectors from Mesoamerica to China.  This is in contrast to 
what is happening in Latin America as a whole.  The Chinese boom is 
steering increasing flows of natural resources and polluting products 
from Latin America (particularly South America) to China.  
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•    Even though our analysis does not establish causal relationships, the 
results show that manufactured products imported from Mesoamerica 
are losing market share in the United States, while China has 
alternatively experienced a significant rise in its U.S. market share of 
manufactured imports with low, medium, and high technological 
content.  This is likely preventing further economic diversification in 
Mesoamerica, and it is probably promoting an increase in the relative 
importance of the primary sector in Mesoamerican exports. 
III.   DISCUSSION  
This section will address the following three issues of concern: a) the 
environmental implications of rising physical outflows; b) the implications 
of Chinese competition in the American manufacturing market; and c) the 
reasons why the outward-oriented model for development has shed such 
divergent results―in terms of improvement of development indicators―in 
Asia and Mesoamerica.  
A. The Environmental Impacts 
A declining proportion of primary exports to total exports may suggest 
that pressures on local natural resources from the exporting sector are also 
diminishing.  However, the rise of the total outflows (exports measured in 
physical units) of primary products and natural resource-based 
manufactured products actually indicates that the Mesoamerican exporting 
sector is likely enlarging its burden on the environment.  In addition, rising 
total outflows of primary products and manufactured products also indicate 
that the analysis of physical flows may shed different insights on the 
relationship between trade and the environment.  Increasing physical flows 
are often driving conflicts about access to resources, particularly between 
local users or dwellers and owners of natural resources who are part of 
large-scale exporting networks, as well as conflicts about the social 
distribution of negative environmental impacts.6,7  Furthermore, many 
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products from the emerging nontraditional and capital-intensive agricultural 
exporting sector―products such as flowers, snow peas, broccoli, melon, 
and chayote―use water and agrochemicals intensively.  As a result, the 
expansion of this sector, which is among the most dynamic in Mesomarica 
(and Latin America as a whole), is often associated with conflicts related to 
water access, as well as problems linked to occupational health and 
degradation of natural resources (water, land) as a result of pollution.8 
In addition, the production of renewable natural resources is often 
associated with land-use conflicts, especially in areas with particularly high 
levels of biodiversity.9  Given the current structural characteristics of the 
Latin American agricultural sector—low crop yields, high ratio of cropland 
to total land area, and a large share of agriculture in overall exports—
Barbier estimates that about 70 percent of the expansion of cultivated land 
area that will take place during the following decades will originate from 
deforestation and wetland conversion.10  Furthermore, given the unequal 
distribution of land tenure in most Mesoamerican countries, a further 
expansion of the physical scale of primary exports is likely steering large 
concentrations of economic benefits. 
B.  China’s Trade Impact on Mesoamerica 
For Mesoamerica, the large importance of trade with the United States 
explains why the Chinese economic boom has been relatively decoupled 
from the expansion of flows of natural resources and polluting products 
exported from this region to China; this is in contrast to what has has 
happened with South America (see fig. 8).  Moreover, Mesoamerica is 
relatively less endowed with nonrenewable natural resources, as compared 
to South America.  China currently accounts for about one quarter of global 
consumption of tin, zinc, aluminium, and copper, and the share of Chinese 
consumption compared to worldwide consumption of these products has 
more than doubled during the last decade.11  The recent increase in global 
demand for nonrenewable natural resources is concentrated in Asia, 
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particularly in China.  For instance, it is reported that from 2000 to 2003, 
China accounted for 76, 95, 99, and 100 percent of the increase in global 
demand for aluminium, steel, nickel, and copper, respectively.12 
South American and African countries, as large providers of 
nonrenewable natural resources to the world economy, are expected to be 
considerably impacted by these trends.  However, there are other types of 
impacts on Mesoamerica as a result of China’s emergence as a major player 
in the world economy. Those impacts need to be assessed mainly by 
analyzing China’s impact on trade patterns between Mesoamerica and the 
United States, particularly in the manufacturing sector in which 
Mesoamerica has recently specialized.   
As stated above, the fact that the Chinese share in American imports of 
all types of manufactured products is dramatically increasing, while the 
Mesoamerican share has already started to experience stagnation, supports a 
claim that competition from China in the manufacturing sector is the main 
channel through which the Chinese economic boom is affecting the way 
Mesoamerica integrates into the world economy.  China’s vast production 
capacity and its enormous provision of cheap labor are depressing the price 
of manufactured products.13  While benefiting low-income consumers, this 
is also preventing the value of low-skilled labor from rising worldwide, 
particularly in countries specializing in the provision of labor for 
manufacturing, such as Mesoamerican countries.  In addition to the low 
costs of Chinese labor, the ease of current international mobility of capital 
and production and the declining freight costs are also making China a 
strong competitor with Mesoamerica for foreign investment.14  This is 
steering a production shift from Mexico to China.  For instance, Horbath 
reports that about 34 percent of all the companies that have closed down 
their maquilas in Mexico between 2001 and 2003 have moved production to 
China.15  
Due to the integration of Chinese workers into the world economy and 
the higher cost of labor in Mesoamerica (measured in terms of minimum 
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wage), low-skilled workers in the Mesoamerican maquila sector would need 
to considerably increase their productivity in order to enlarge their 
bargaining power and attain higher salaries.  However, a major 
improvement in productivity due to increased capabilities of workers is not 
very likely to occur in Mesoamerica, given the structural lack of investment 
in education and innovation in the region.  In general, Latin American 
economies have weaker education and technological infrastructures when 
compared to East and Southeast Asia.16  The trends presented in the 
previous section suggest that Chinese competition is limiting the expansion 
of the manufacturing export sector in Mesoamerica, and thus its capacity to 
provide employment.  Additionally, as mentioned before, economic 
liberalization policies have reduced employment opportunities in the rural 
sector.  The combination of all of the above factors makes competition with 
China more likely to hinder the integration of low-skilled workers into the 
formal economic sector, which will maintain the high share of informal 
labor and widen income distribution.  
C.  Divergent Results of the Outward-Development Model 
 There has been a tremendous expansion in both the scale of exports and 
the overall income earned by exporters of cheap manufactured products.  
This has been fueled by rising global demand for these products.  Thus, 
despite falling prices of manufactured products, the income terms of trade 
have improved noticeably in Asia.17  However, in spite of following trends 
similar to China and Southeast Asian countries in terms of export expansion 
and diversification, most Mesoamerican countries have experienced two 
“lost” decades, characterized by stagnant social indicators of development 
and scanty economic growth.18  Hence, critical questions must be asked: 
Why have the outcomes of the outward-oriented development model been 
so different in Asia and Mesoamerica?  Why has Mesoamerica experienced 
a gap between the achievement of some expected outcomes of the outward-
oriented model—namely exports expansion and diversification—and the 
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improvement of development indicators?  Certainly there is not a single 
answer to these daunting questions.  Nonetheless, I think that a critical 
factor in understanding these disparate outcomes  is the extent to which the 
manufacture-exporting sector has established backward and forward 
linkages with other sectors of the national economy; another key factor is 
the extent to which mechanisms for knowledge transfer and innovation have 
been established. 
1. Maquila Sectors in Mesoamerica and Backward and Forward 
Linkages 
One reason for the resulting differences between China and Mesoamerica 
is that the maquila sector in Mesoamerica has generally been unable to 
upgrade production processes from assembly-line activities in order to 
become the driving force of dynamic networks of innovation; while exactly 
that type of upgrade is happening in Asia.  The maquila in Central 
America—with the exception of the production of microchips by Intel in 
Costa Rica—has remained specialized in low-tech manufacturing, 
particularly in the textile industry.  In general, when characterized according 
to trade patterns, Central American countries still specialize in sectors with 
very little value added.19  Nevertheless, when characterized following trade 
classifications based on technological content, the manufacture-exporting 
sector in Mexico has experienced a dramatic transformation.  The share of 
high-tech manufactured products in the total outcome of the exporting 
sector has noticeably increased in Mexico.20  However, when analyzed 
according to processes taking place at the production level―even though 
some clusters have been able to achieve a higher level of industrial 
upgrading21―most of the Mexican maquila is still characterized by 
assembly of imported parts (mainly from the United States) and the re-
exporting of the final products back to the United States, adding only the 
assembly work of usually low-skilled labor at the local level.22  
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The persistence of assembly line processes has been encouraged by the 
very incentives designed to promote the maquila sector, such as tax 
exceptions for transitory imports of inputs for the maquila. These 
incentives—including zero trade tariffs, no value added, or income taxes—
create barriers for establishing local backward linkages because the 
substitution of imports by local provision is hampered by the relative larger 
cost of the latter.23  On the contrary, the transfer of knowledge and the 
acquisition of local upgrading capacities have been two key pillars of the 
outward-oriented development model implemented in China.24  The lack of 
local linkages of the maquila sector in Mesoamerica explains why a 
tremendous expansion of the exporting sector has been generally decoupled 
from the evolution of local development indicators. 
2.  Other Institutional Components  
Institutional components may also play a role in explaining the 
differences between China and Mesoamerica regarding the performance of 
the outward-oriented development model.  For example, the concentration 
of economic power is a distinctive feature of Mesoamerican countries as 
compared to China.25  This concentration has led to economic inefficiencies 
because of a high incidence of monopolies, oligopolies, structural high-
income inequality, large levels of social exclusion, and low internal 
demand.  These conditions have become a serious impediment to balanced 
economic development in Mesoamerica because the economic benefits 
arising from the new opportunities offered by the globalization process have 
been reaped by only a small portion of the population.  Corruption and 
weak institutions have also been persistent features of Mesoamerican 
countries, and these have hindered the consolidation of long-term policies 
or effective wealth-redistribution programs, thereby creating conditions for 
political and social instability.  
In China, and most East Asian countries, global economic integration has 
been accompanied by state interventions aiming to ensure knowledge 
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transfer and to build up local industrial capacities.26  This has not been the 
case in Mesoamerica.  Contrary to what occurred when the model of import 
substitution industrialization was applied, long-term planning for economic 
development in Latin America—including the implementation of policies 
for achieving industrialization—has generally been abandoned during the 
liberalization period.27  Industrialization was expected to be the outcome of 
a larger integration into the world economy by means of following 
comparative advantages—a process that would be accelerated by foreign 
investment.  Nonetheless, as argued above, liberalization policies have not 
been sufficient to trigger actual industrialization beyond mere assembly of 
imported parts.  Paradoxically, as mentioned above, economic incentives 
for the promotion of the maquila have actually contributed to prevent the 
development of local industrial capacities in the long term.  Many of these 
measures that were supposed to have been temporary, in order to allow the 
consolidation of the exporting-manufacturing sector, have nevertheless 
become permanent.28 
After assessing the performance of the outward-oriented development 
model in Mesoamerica and Asia, it seems clear that a shift—from policies 
encouraging mere assembly processes to policies aiming to promote the 
development of local industrial capacities—is needed in order to make 
integration into the world economy a real driving force of development.  
However, the current harsh competition with China makes such policy 
changes difficult because it reduces the bargaining power of national states, 
vis-à-vis international capitals in search of appropriate conditions for the 
establishment of manufacturing plants.  The Mesoamerican region is 
definitively facing a daunting development challenge and, at least for the 
time being, it does not appear that the necessary policy changes will be 
developed and adopted.  For example, Central American countries are 
currently setting up free trade agreements with the United States without 
systematically evaluating why NAFTA has dramatically failed to shape a 
sustainable and equitable development path for Mexico.  Further, economic 
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planning or state interventions for promoting industrialization are still 
almost forbidden words in the mainstream political discourse in 
Mesoamerica.  The dogmatic adoption of development recipes has made 
politicians and economists unable to either recognize previous mistakes or 
invent alternative options for the future. 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
The Chinese economic boom has increased the physical outflows in the 
primary and polluting sectors from South America to China.  This is then 
increasing the share of these sectors in Latin American total exports and, 
subsequently, its degree of primary specialization.  However, the effect has 
been different in Mesoamerica.  There is no clear trend toward increasing 
physical flows in the primary sector between Mesoamerica and China.  The 
significance of manufactured-products trade with the United States, and the 
greater share of manufactured products in exports in this region, may 
explain this outcome. 
Even though the evidence is not conclusive, the results suggest that 
Chinese competition is leading to a loss of market share of Mesoamerican-
manufactured exports in the United States.  This prevents further economic 
diversification and will likely enlarge the scale of primary exports.  It is 
revealing that while the share of primary exports has dropped in the period 
of analysis, total physical outflows of natural resources from Mesoamerica 
has increased substantially, which is likely linked to rising pressures on the 
environment. 
The failure to couple the integration into the world economy with major 
improvements in development indicators suggests that Mesoamerican 
countries need to undertake radical changes in order to create incentives for 
promoting the acquisition of real industrial capacities.  However, strong 
competition with China is making such a shift extremely difficult because 
any attempt to bargain for greater local benefits would likely impart larger 
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operational costs on transnational corporations and add an incentive for 
international capital to move away. 
There is a need for further research on policies for the promotion of 
forward and backward linkages between the exporting-manufacturing sector 
and other local economic sectors, in addition to strategies for ensuring 
knowledge transfer and the acquisition of industrial skills (which would 
allow a move away and forward from assembly processes).  The role of 
government in steering the development of industrial capacity has to be 
revised.  Some key lessons may be learned from the industrialization 
experience of Southeast Asian countries.  Additionally, the long-term 
development implications of primary specialization is a subject that needs 
to be revisited in Latin America.  In particular, efforts should be devoted to 
analyzing the relationship between primary specialization, income 
inequality, and institutional quality from a historical and comparative 
perspective. 
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